TEXT BOXES
Box 1: Paris Declaration donor commitments related to joint country strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (Kharas, 2007) . The purpose of this paper is to report on and draw lessons from the experience with the preparation and implementation of joint country assistance strategies.
TABLES

The analysis draws on two sources of information:
It refl ects the lessons from the author's personal involvement as a facilitator in the preparation of a joint country assistance strategy in Tajikistan. While such direct association as a "participant observer" brings with it risks of possible biases in interpretation, it has the great advantage of close, fi rst-hand observation.
Since the Tajikistan process was not yet completed at the time of writing this paper, the descriptions and conclusions from this case study can only be seen as preliminary. Second, the paper draws on a desk review of available documentation of country experiences elsewhere in the world, much of it informal and qualitative. No claim to completeness or statistical signifi cance of conclusions can be made. Furthermore, the joint country assistance strategy process, as it is implemented on the ground, does not currently follow any standard format or approach, since there is no explicit agreement (and quite some variance) on (1) the main purpose and objectives of joint strategy process,
(2) what are the necessary elements/components, or (3) even whose instrument it should be (donors or partner country government).
Therefore, this paper is only a fi rst step in an effort to fi ll a substantial gap in our understanding of how the Paris Declaration commitments are being implemented on the ground and the role that joint country assistance strategies can or should play in this implementation process. One of the main conclusions of this paper is that a more systematic evaluation of completed and ongoing joint country assistance strategies is an urgent priority.
Following this introduction, the fi rst section reviews the Paris Declaration and its links to joint country assistance strategies. The next section provides an overview of the available assessments of joint country strategy experience. This is followed by a section that assesses specifi c aspects of the joint country strategy process, drawing on worldwide experience as well as the Tajik experience. The concluding section presents overall conclusions and recommendations for the de- There are, of course, many ways in which coordination of donor activities on the ground can be achieved.
In most countries some form of an on-going coordination mechanism exists. Instruments such as joint Work together to establish mutually agreed frameworks that provide reliable assessments of performance, transparency and accountability of country systems.
Align their analytic and fi nancial support with partners' capacity development objectives and strategies, make effective use of existing capacities and harmonise support for capacity development according.
Implement, where feasible, common arrangements at country level for planning, funding (e.g. joint fi nancial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to government on donor activities and aid fl ows.
Make full use of their respective comparative advantage at sector or country level by delegating, where appropriate, authority to lead donors for the execution of programmes, activities and tasks.
Harmonise their activities. Harmonisation is all the more crucial in the absence of strong government leadership. It should focus on upstream analysis, joint assessments, joint strategies, co-ordination of political engagement; and practical initiatives such as the establishment of joint donor offi ces.
Align to the maximum extent possible behind central government-led strategies or, if that is not possible, donors should make maximum use of country, regional, sector or non-government systems.
Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements, and, until they can rely more extensively on partner countries' statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems, with partner countries to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting.
Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective country level mechanisms mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the Partnership Commitments. Mutual accountability -Number of partner countries that undertake mutual assessments of progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness including those in this Declaration.
All partner countries have mutual assessment reviews in place. 
Inclusiveness of the process
Division of labor and sectoral lead responsibility
A clearer focus of each donor on their respective areas of interest and capacity, avoidance of unnecessary overlap and duplication, and identification of gaps are key outcomes of a good joint strategy process. 
Role of analytical work
Some assessments (e. A "Drivers of Change" study provided the common underpinning for an agreement of the opportunities and challenges in Tajikistan and its donor community.
Five sector studies on donor engagement provided valuable insights into sector strategic priorities and lessons from past donor engagement in each sector.
An independent aid effectiveness study offered donors and government a useful mirror on how the aid effort is perceived from a country perspective and contributed to ensuring a strong client orientation by the donors.
• • •
A study on aid coordination mechanisms helped to clarify how existing coordination could be improved.
To achieve maximum impact and usefulness of the background studies it is important to ensure that they are published in a manner that makes them widely available for future use in country and for the process of evaluation and learning about joint country assistance strategies more generally. In the case of Tajikistan, logistical aspects were explicitly considered and resolved at various stages:
Creation of the JCPS Steering Group and Secretariat: these were essential elements that kept the process going; although more continuity in steer-
• •
ing group leadership and secretariat staffi ng would have helped.
Financing of secretariat and of background studies: while various donors contributed to fund individual background studies, much of the fi nancing to keep the process going was provided by DFID in a fl exible and un-bureaucratic manner; this was critical to the success of the process.
Engagement by donor staff: the heads of the principal participating donor agencies in the country were fully engaged in the process; the fact that many of them had recently arrived and started with fresh energy and willingness to cooperate was key; the unexpected departure of the head of DFID midway created an important discontinuity in leadership. The fact that Tajikistan and its donors had to deal with a severe water, energy and economic crisis throughout much of the preparation process was both a boost to cooperation and a hindrance: the exigencies of the crisis brought donors and government together in facing a common threat, but also diverted attention from long-term development challenges to crisis response.
Engagement by government: engagement by government was part of the goal of the JCPS exercise, but also brought with it obvious challenges, including the need for translation of all documents into Russian with added cost and time requirements; the need for consultations and government review of all documentation added to the cost and time requirements and the logistical diffi culties of managing the process; here the role of the secretariat was key.
Leadership and team work: As mentioned above, the leadership and teamwork by the local heads of the main donor agencies in getting the JCPS process started and in keeping the preparation process focused and on track for a good part of the preparation process. However, they were only partly able to address the fundamental collective action problem that arises in a case where no single agency or actor has a mandate and accountability to take a lead in managing a complex process. With the exception Six of eight donor respondents to a questionnaire on the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy indicated that the value added of the process as substantial or high.
Government perceptions of the process were more positive than those of donors, since it reduced the disruption of and burden on the government from donor activities; In Tanzania, donors agreed that the process had reduced transaction costs for the government while it increased transaction costs for donors.
19
The joint strategy process had a positive impact on the African Development Bank's own strategy development.
For Tajikistan, the total elapsed time from initiation to the offi cial launch of the JCPS report is expected to take about 18 months, somewhat longer than the initial plan to limit preparation to 12 months. This relatively fast pace was facilitated by an explicit up-front commitment by donors to a tight timetable, but also by the fact that a decision was made mid-way to divide the process into two stages and effectively leave some of the more diffi cult aspects (division of labor, pro- Most likely the optimal approach will involve a combination of the second and third alternatives. Further exploration of the third alternative is beyond the scope of this paper. 20 Therefore, the remainder of this paper will briefl y summarize the key recommendations for pursuing the second alternative if the potential of using joint country strategies is to be further explored with a view to broadening and strengthening its use.
These recommendations fall into two clusters: The fi rst cluster refers to possible actions at the country level, the second cluster to actions at the international level-at the OECD-DAC and at the headquarters of the aid agencies.
Country-level actions
The country's government and/or donors at the country level will have to take the initiative in organizing a joint country strategy process. With the appropriate guidance and support from the DAC and the Paris Declaration process this could occur much more frequently.
Second, the initiators of the exercise will have to agree on who would be invited to participate in the process. This involves diffi cult trade-offs between the size and the effectiveness of the exercise. This may be best resolved by a phased approach that starts with a limited number of donors but leads to the eventual inclusion of all major offi cial and private donors, if they are willing to participate.
Ideally the government should lead the joint strategy exercise, but if it is unable or unwilling to do so or if the donors are unwilling to have it play that role, one donor or a small group of donors will have to take the lead. In the past, this role has often been assumed by the World Bank, but it appears recently that the Bank is less able or willing to assume the lead role in donor coordination on the ground. 21 If the government is not in the lead, it is critical to make sure it is as fully engaged as possible in the process, and that the joint strategy exercise is fully aligned with the national development strategy. Donors should make a concerted effort to strengthen the government's capacity to be fully engaged in and eventually take a lead in the joint strategy process.
• • •
Participants need to clarify early on that the key to success will not be the joint strategy documents, but an effective process of strategy preparation and implementation that results in improved aid effectiveness-although a high quality document will be an important and useful product associated with such a process. During its implementation, monitoring of progress and learning from the experience is likely to be an important part of a good strategy process.
The scope of the strategy should be tailored to the local conditions. In the interest of timeliness and cost containment, it is better to start with a less ambitious approach which focuses, as in the case of Tajikistan, on trust building, information exchange, development of a common vision and principles of partnership, as well as on improving the practical modalities of coordination. Over time, the scope can be expanded to focus on the more diffi cult tasks of division of labor, sector program alignment, leadership and results benchmarks. In countries with a stronger track record of donor and government cooperation, as in the Kyrgyz Republic, a more ambitious approach may be feasible from the beginning of the joint strategy process.
In preparing joint country strategies, high quality analytical background work is very important. As in the case of Tajikistan's JCPS, this should involve an assessment of development trends and challenges (such as the "drivers of change" exercise supported by DFID) as well as a review of aid effectiveness and aid coordination mechanisms overall and in specifi c sectors and thematic areas. Donor agencies must be willing to fund and manage this analytical work.
For the logistics of the process, aside from providing clear overall leadership, a subgroup of donors should act as a steering group in support of the lead agency. In turn, there will generally be a need to establish a secretariat. When the government is in the lead, a government agency can take on this role. When a donor is in the lead, a separate secretariat, working in close cooperation with the relevant government agencies, should be established. Joint do- Consultation with non-participant stakeholders is an important, but easily neglected, part of the process. Key stakeholders include non-participating offi cial and private donors, recipient government ministries and governmental agencies (including provincial and local authorities), parliamentary representatives, businesses and civil society. It will be helpful to align these consultation processes with those used for the development of national development plans or Poverty Reduction Strategies, if they are satisfactory.
A fi nancing plan for the out-of-pocket costs of the exercise needs to be developed and funding sources need to be identifi ed and agreed upon-in particular for the secretariat, the analytical work and meeting expenses. Government and donors need to identify the staff who will manage and support the process and relevant costs will have to included in government and donor agency budgets as appropriate.
If joint country strategies are to become an important pillar of the implementation process of the Paris Declaration principles then it will be essential that the DAC, the donor headquarters and the donors' evaluation offi ces become more effectively engaged in supporting the in-country process. They need to align managerial and staff incentives for the preparation and implementation of effective strategies; provide appropriate evaluation and learning support; and program the incremental fi nancial and staff costs of process.
Actions at above country level
OECD-DAC and individual donor agencies should systematically evaluate the experiences of joint country assistance strategies that have been prepared and are under implementation.
• • • •
Based on such evaluations, donor agencies should decide whether they wish to support and engage in joint country strategies. If they wish to do so, they should provide guidance and support to their fi eld staff in their participation in such exercises.
The donor community may wish to identify one agency as the presumptive leader among donors for aid coordination on the ground in countries where governments do not have the capacity or the will to take clear leadership of the aid coordination effort. Traditionally this has been a role of the World Bank or sometimes UNDP. However, in recent years, they have less readily exerted this leadership role and it has not been as readily accepted by other parties. This is one of the factors explaining the diffi culties that donors have in overcoming their collective action problem to assume leadership in the face of weak government capacity. Reestablishing the presumption of lead responsibility and accountability in aid coordination for the World Bank would appear to be the most pragmatic way to proceed. This would not rule out that in specifi c countries DFID commissioned a study on "Drivers of Change," which created a shared understanding of the economic, social and political factors that drive or obstruct progress within Tajikistan and helped to identify ways in which donors can build on or react to these drivers in order to support the country's development. Box A1 summarizes the results of this study. Little reform to date in rule of law and less in human rights. Donor interventions are fragmented and often not multi-year with no vision for the sector, which has cross-cutting importance. Judicial reform should be a priority.
In the public sector many active donors have a collective capacity to overwhelm government capacities. Leadership by government with clear coordination mechanisms would help.
In the real sectors, there is strong coordination in some sectors (transport, energy). Common strategies help (e.g., CAREC in transport and energy). A challenge is to agree on priorities and enhance coordination with new bilaterals.
Several donors are leaving the agriculture sector (50 percent of grant funders), sustainability and coordination of ongoing programs is an issue. (See Box A4.)
In the private and fi nancial sector there are scattered interventions and pilot activities. More impact could be achieved by scaling-up successful programs to create economies of scale on the donor side.
Social sectors are under-funded, and households bear a high share of out of pocket costs. Donors are working together with Government on developing sector-wide approaches (SWAps) in health and education. Donor funds should complement, not substitute, government funding. The World Bank supported an independent assessment of aid effectiveness by a team of local consultants that was commissioned and supervised by the Wolfensohn Center for Development as part of its multi-country study on aid effectiveness. 34 A
• key purpose of this study was to contribute a view to the discussions on how aid is seen from a Tajik country perspective. See Box A4 for the key fi ndings of this study as presented to the donors at the fi rst retreat.
The JCPS Executive Committee commissioned a study under the supervision of WHO on the modalities of aid coordination in Tajikistan but it was not finalized at the time of the completion of this paper. The fi rst map showed that in 2008, six donors were active in the relatively better-off western and northern provinces of the country, with more than one donor active in some locations, while there were no donors active in the poor eastern provinces. The conclusion was that lack of coordination led to overlapping and sometimes inconsistent support in parts of the country, while other parts of the country were neglected. The second slide showed that by January 2009 most donors were terminating their programs, with only two donors remaining, principally the EU, leading to a dramatic reduction in support and a lack in continuity of donor engagement in many locations. Donors agreed that there are potential benefi ts from greater division of labor and better harmonization of approaches, and that the uncoordinated departure of individual donors from specifi c sectors or subsectors can lead to serious problems of discontinuity that could be avoided through better coordination.
Source: Tajikistan JCPS exercise
Box A4: Key fi ndings of aid effectiveness study
Rising donor fragmentation creates serious coordination challenges and costs for the government.
Lack of use of joint operational modalities (SWAps, Joint PIUs, joint missions) represent missed opportunities.
Volatility and discontinuities create problems.
Much aid remains supply driven and alignment of donor priorities with government priorities is limited (except for new donors).
Management of database on aid fl ows is improving, but faces signifi cant challenges.
Budget, public investment and aid processes are unconnected and M&E is incomplete.
Aid coordination processes are fragmented and donor driven. 
Costs of the Tajikistan JCPS process
No defi nitive costing information is currently available, so all that could be done for this paper was to However, based on the developments so far, it is possible to conclude that the process, which has been set in motion has the potential for signifi cantly enhancing aid coordination on the ground.
Key success factors in Tajikistan were these: strong leadership from selected agency heads within the donor community and readiness to finance the out-of-pocket expenses of the exercise;
• support from the head of state and hence readiness of the government to participate actively; a remarkable openness to self-refl ection and team work among the donor and government participants, underpinned by good analytical work; flexibility in the approach to the JCPS exercise, including restructuring the process from an ambitious comprehensive process into a realistic phased two-stage exercise; and the establishment of a steering group supported by a secretariat who together managed a disciplined process that kept time requirements and costs in check.
The key challenges were and are:
ensuring government ownership and establishing a basis of trust among donors and government; reaching out to other stake holders in Tajikistan; engaging with donors outside the JCPS process;
consolidating and strengthening existing donor coordination mechanisms and clarifying the government's role in the coordination process;
keeping the process on time table, despite the persistent economic crisis conditions in the country and turn-over in key donor, government and secretariat personnel;
timely completion of the fi rst stage and effective integration of the second stage into a review of PRS2; monitoring progress against benchmarks and adapting the coordination and alignment approach in light of lessons learned; and avoiding donor and government fatigue with the JPCS process. Reportedly the implementation of the joint strategy has been diffi cult even for Nigeria, although only two donors were involved.
This point was suggested to the author by Nisha
Agrawal.
The Danida/EC report notes that in the case of Tanzania the joint assistance strategy process was government owned, while in Uganda and Zambia it was donor driven.
This point was suggested by Nisha Agrawal.
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There was no expectation of assignment to specifi c donors of lead responsibility for specifi c sectors nor to establish joint programming or common pool funding arrangements.
Andrea Kucey pointed out that in the case of Kyrgyz Republic there was a prior history of donor coordination, which permitted a more ambitious approach.
The quality of the strategy document cannot yet be assessed, since the fi nal version had not yet been prepared at the time of writing of this study.
The issue of discontinuities in donor staff engaged in country program delivery is a fundamental problem that affects the quality of aid. The Tajik JCPS process is just one example for this.
According to Irish Aid (2008, p. 12) there was some progress on division of labor issues in 2008.
In the case of Tajikistan, the analytical studies 11.
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relevant information could have been usefully exchanged.
Another potential disconnect can arise from the different perspectives and agendas of the diplomatic and the aid representatives on the ground.
In the case of Tajikistan, the dialogue between donors and the government at the senior most level was led by the ambassadors whose focus tends to be more on the political and diplomatic aspects of the relationship, while donor agency heads and staff, whose focus is more on the development priorities and implementation of programs, generally had access only to ministerial or sub-ministerial policy levels of the government. Apparently this was the fi rst time that the president met the heads of donor agencies as a group. Previously such meetings had been reserved for ambassadors only and hence focused more on political aspects than on the developmental aspects of government-donor relations.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Tajikistan Aid Effectiveness Study/Chapter
Based on donor data in the Tajikistan Aid Effectiveness Study/Chapter
The supportive factors for Kyrgyz Republic were identifi ed by Andrea Kucey.
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